2 Indeed Cook's robust defense of Adorno's theory of ideology and her related criticism of Habermas is a good example of the tendency I have described. 3 I think that tendency is misplaced, and I want to take this opportunity to defend Habermas's convincing objections to Adorno's conception of critical theory. I argue that
Habermas does not criticise Adorno's conception of ideology strongly enough. For
Adorno's conception of ideology, which Cook attempts to defend, is conceptually and epistemologically incoherent. A fortiori it is of little theoretical or practical use to social theorists, who should look for better alternatives. Whilst Habermas's version of social-criticism is cumbersome and sometimes opaque, it is not incoherent. On the contrary it is self-consistent, it is methodologically more sound and historically more accurate than is Adorno's, and it provides a far more useful set of analytic tools to social critic. warranted. Cook claims that they are not, because Adorno 'never denied the rational potential in bourgeois culture'. 5 Of course in one sense Adorno did not deny this. He and Horkheimer famously remark in the preface to the Dialectic of Enlightenment that 'social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought', and they are certainly thinking, among other things, of the humanitarian ideals of liberty, equality and solidarity, i.e. of the 'liberal ideology' which Cook takes to be the basis of Adorno's ideology-critique. 6 But this evidence is double-edged, as is Adorno and Horkheimer's whole conception of enlightenment rationality. For Adorno claims that the very enlightenment rationality which was supposed to liberate human beings from enthralment to nature, has in fact enslaved them all the more and led to a reversion to barbarism. Moreover this reversion is not an accident of the implementation of the bourgeois ideals enshrined in enlightenment, for the notion of 'this very way of thinking (i.e., rational enlightened thought -GF)…already contains the seed of its reversal universally apparent today.' 7 Cook's defence of Adorno trades on the ambiguity of the phrase 'rational potential' which means something very different for Adorno and Horkheimer than it does for Habermas. Adorno and Horkheimer, evidently believe that the rational potential of modern culture is also the seed of destruction -the danger as well as the saving power. 8 Habermas does not believe this.
He makes a categorial distinction between communicative and instrumental rationality. Using this distinction, he argues that while the expansion of systems of instrumental rationality that takes place under the process of modernisation do have socially deleterious effects, rationality and rationalisation -and here he differs from iii. We can have no positive conception of the good. Adorno frequently claims that the good (or what he calls variously 'reconciliation', 'redemption' 'happiness' and 'utopia') cannot be thought. 15 He means not just that we cannot represent or picture the good, utopia etc. We cannot even conceive it without falsifying it, because to conceive is to identify.
As a matter of interest, Adorno seems to slide between two slightly different views -call them strong and weak negativity -depending on the context in which or the audience for whom he is writing. Strong negativity is the view that there is no good in the world, apart from the knowledge that there is no good in the world, assuming such knowledge is indeed good. 16 Weak negativity is the view that there is some good in the world -for example the experience of pleasure granted by certain works of art, or spontaneous outpourings of human warmth and love -however only sufficient to make manifest their absence from the social totality. They are the exception, not the rule, of social reality; points of resistance to it, not its basis. Firstly, why is it that ideological false beliefs persist and fail to be overturned, when the falsity of other beliefs tends to manifest itself to agents through their unsuccessful practical interventions in the world or through the epistemic disappointments of belief holders? What is it that prevents the falsity of ideological beliefs from coming to light as a matter of course? The theory of ideology offers no answer to this question.
Secondly, supposing a plausible answer to the first question can be given, it will have to allow the theory of ideology itself not to be subject to the putative illusion forming mechanism. For, ideology-critique, if it is not to be self-undermining, cannot itself be just another ideology. Hence it is not enough for the social theorist qua ideology-critic to show that there is a socio-economic mechanism which produces false beliefs that somehow function to legitimate certain power relations. The ideology-critic has into the bargain to identify (or at least to be able assume that there exists) another mechanism which reliably produces true, non-ideological beliefs, among which she can count her own theory. She must be able to justifiably exempt her own theory from suspicion that it is itself an ideology. Cook assumes that she and her readers are more 'ideology-proof' than Habermas, but offers no justification for this assumption. and thus sever at the root the opportunities that modernity presents (TKH2 449-548/TCA2 303-374). On the positive side, as we have seen, modernity presents an opportunity for modern subjects to establish the legitimacy of institutions, customs and practices on the basis of validity-claims, a basis that promises stability, transparency and accountability. 28 For in modern societies discourse functions as a way of replenishing the repository of shared meanings that constitute the lifeworld, by restoring, repairing or replacing problematised understandings, and in this manner discourse is able partly to compensate for the demise of religious traditions as a common source of meaning, value, and belief (PNK, 226). Now, one consequence of Habermas's view that the chief belief-forming mechanisms of rationalized modern societies are linguistic, discursive practices is that systematic illusions in the form of religious ideologies tend to become destabilized by rational reflection. Cook objects to this conception of modernity on the grounds that it implies 'that we have gained a degree of intellectual maturity that cannot be revoked.' 29 This is roughly right, although it gives Habermas's theory an individualistic and intellectualist bias which he would certainly want to resist. For
Habermas it is a matter of the cognitive complexity of the social systems within which 'we' are socialized -i.e. of the degree to which validity (actual and possible rational discourse) provides the basis of social order. 30 His view certainly does not imply that people's beliefs and desires cannot be manipulated by advertising. It implies only that the influence of such mechanisms of manipulation is in principle discoverable by the agents at whom it is aimed, that the falsity of the beliefs which they produce is not systematically prevented from coming to light by their social function, as is putatively the case with ideologies. Further, Habermas never denies that modern subjects feel disempowered and helpless before the anonymous and impersonal forces of the administrative and economic systems, and that the individual agents who inhabit the lifeworld are largely ignorant of the myriad ways in which present society depends on their collective cognitive and practical activity. It is just that social theory does not need to posit the influence of ideology -systematic massdeception and collective false-consciousness -to explain these things. 31 To claim, as
Cook does, that the process of colonization is itself reinforced ideologically through the medium of advertising, is to miss the methodological point of introducing the theory of colonization in the first place. The pathologies of modern capitalist societies are more mundane and far less mysterious than the theory of ideology makes them appear to be. Except for cases of pathological incapacity, one can and must communicate; it is a useful and easy way to contribute to the peace of others and one's own. Because silence, the absence of signals, is in its turn a signal, but it is ambiguous, and ambiguity generates anxiety and suspicion. To say that it is impossible to communicate is false; one always can. To refuse to communicate is a failing; we are biologically predisposed to communication, and in particular to its highly evolved and noble form, which is language. 
